Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Polemarchakis, Herakles

Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Herakles Polemarchakis ()
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Herakles Polemarchakis: Brown University

Chapter 12 in Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency, 2006, pp 225-244 from Springer

Abstract: Summary Incomplete asset markets cause competitive equilibria to be constrained suboptimal and provides scope for Pareto improving interventions. In this paper, we examine how intervention in prices in asset or spot commodity markets serves this purpose. We show that, if fix-price equilibria behave sufficiently regularly near Walrasian equilibria, Pareto improving price regulation is generically possible. An advantage of price regulation, contrasted with interventions in individuals’ asset portfolios, is that it operates anonymously, on market variables.

Keywords: Incomplete asset market; Fix-price equilibria; Pareto improvement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-28161-0_12

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28161-4_12

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