Core-Equivalence for the Nash Bargaining Solution

Walter Trockel ()
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Walter Trockel: Bielefeld University

Chapter 20 in Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency, 2006, pp 371-379 from Springer

Abstract: Summary Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies. The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results reconfirm the Walrasian approach to Nash bargaining of Trockel (1996). Moreover we establish the same speed of convergence as is known from Debreu (1975) and Grodal (1975) for replicated pure exchange economies and for regular purely competitive sequences of economies, respectively.

Keywords: Nash-solution; Core convergence; Equivalence theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-28161-0_20

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28161-4_20

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