Decentralized credit and monetary exchange without public record keeping

P. Dean Corbae and Joseph Ritter ()
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Joseph Ritter: University of Minnesota

A chapter in Recent Developments on Money and Finance, 2006, pp 235-253 from Springer

Abstract: Summary We relax a standard assumption on the matching technology in a search model of money. In particular, agents may remain in a long-term partnership as long as it is in their self-interest.With this simple modification, it is possible to support self-enforcing, intertemporal trade which resembles credit without a public record keeping device. We examine conditions for coexistence of currency and credit and the welfare gains/losses associated with the introduction of money.

Keywords: Search Model; Public Record; Incentive Constraint; Money Holding; Monetary Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-29500-6_12

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-29500-3_12

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