The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games

Lin Zhou ()
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Lin Zhou: Arizona State University

A chapter in Rationality and Equilibrium, 2006, pp 57-66 from Springer

Abstract: Summary In this paper I study a class of two-player games, in which both players’ action sets are [0, 1] and their payoff functions are continuous in joint actions and quasi-concave in own actions. I show that a no-improper-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for a finite subset A of [0, 1] × [0, 1] to be the set of Nash equilibria of such a game.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; revealed preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-3-540-29578-5_3

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-29578-X_3

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