Introduction

Keith L. Dougherty () and Julian Edward ()
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Keith L. Dougherty: University of Georgia
Julian Edward: Florida International University

Chapter Chapter 1 in The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design, 2011, pp 1-7 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A wave of economic and political liberalization is sweeping the world. Many countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe have made transitions from semi-closed to open societies and from authoritarian governments to liberal democracies. In several of these cases, the transition has been accompanied by a new constitution that purports to increase the fairness and efficiency of the regime. Some who adopt these new constitutions are interested in manipulating policies for their narrow interests. Others are interested in writing constitutions that reflect the concerns of the populace and provide greater legitimacy for their government.

Keywords: Public Choice; Majority Rule; Social Contract; Vote Rule; External Cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-0-387-98171-0_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-98171-0_1

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