Clarifying Concepts

Keith L. Dougherty () and Julian Edward ()
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Keith L. Dougherty: University of Georgia
Julian Edward: Florida International University

Chapter Chapter 3 in The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design, 2011, pp 21-31 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Unanimity rule and the Pareto criterion appear so alike that several authors have treated them as almost interchangeable. Arrow (1951) described the Pareto principle as a unanimity principle. Fishburn (1973) refers to the Pareto criterion as strong unanimity. And Buchanan (1967, 285) described unanimity rule as the “political counterpart” of the Pareto criterion.

Keywords: Pareto Optimality; Pareto Improvement; Unanimity Rule; Pareto Principle; Pareto Optimal Outcome (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-98171-0_3

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