Constitutional Decision Making

Keith L. Dougherty () and Julian Edward ()
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Keith L. Dougherty: University of Georgia
Julian Edward: Florida International University

Chapter Chapter 4 in The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design, 2011, pp 33-56 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract K-majority rules, such as majority rule, supermajority rules, and unanimity rule, have been used in legislative settings. The British House of Commons and the U.S. House of Representatives use simple majority rule for ordinary decisions; the U.S. Senate requires approval of 3/5ths of its members to pass “filibuster-proof” legislation; and the Council of the European Union requires unanimity rule for votes in some issue areas.

Keywords: Majority Rule; Ideal Point; Pareto Optimality; Pareto Improvement; Unanimity Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-98171-0_4

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