Electoral Decision Making

Keith L. Dougherty () and Julian Edward ()
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Keith L. Dougherty: University of Georgia
Julian Edward: Florida International University

Chapter Chapter 6 in The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design, 2011, pp 73-95 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Everyone remembers the 2000 U.S. presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore. Bush won more Electoral College votes than Gore, and with it the presidency. Nevertheless, Gore won more popular votes than Bush. Many argued that Gore should have been elected the president because he won the plurality of the popular vote. Making such an argument implies that one voting rule (plurality rule) is more desirable than another voting rule (the Electoral College) and opens up a discussion about the desirable properties of voting rules and which voting rule is best. Although one voting rule may be particularly adept at fulfilling one criterion, other voting rules may be particularly adept at fulfilling other criteria. Since no voting rule satisfies a small subset of reasonable criteria (Arrow, 1951), the natural question is which rules are most likely to satisfy common norms?

Keywords: Majority Rule; Vote Rule; Condorcet Winner; Strategic Vote; Plurality Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-98171-0_6

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