Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks

Thomas König () and Marc Debus ()
Additional contact information
Thomas König: University of Mannheim
Marc Debus: University of Mannheim

Chapter Chapter 13 in Reform Processes and Policy Change, 2011, pp 269-283 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We recapitulate the main findings of the contributions of this book, which provides an evaluation of the current state of veto player theory for the analysis of reform making in modern democracies. The contributions of this book provide for further insights into three central aspects of veto player analysis in order to explain reforms in modern democracies. Given Tsebelis’ framework on the interaction between political actors’ institutional power, their preferences, and the location of the status quo, the book chapters stress (1) the identification of veto players’ preference for measuring their reform-making behaviour, (2) the interpretation of other phenomena in complex veto player systems, which can provide additional insight into reform making, and (3) the modelling of strategic reform-making behaviour in veto player systems.

Keywords: Policy Preference; Party System; Policy Position; Coalition Government; Veto Player (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-5809-9_13

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9781441958099

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_13

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().