 Introduction: Constitutional MythsChapter Chapter 1 in Constitutional Mythologies, 2011, pp 1-7 from Springer Abstract: Abstract Human societies function correctly, at least in part, because the individuals who belong to them share some common beliefs about their origins, foundations and, as far as social sciences and political economy is concerned, how interactions are organized. These beliefs that are also called “myths” are therefore fundamental. They perform one or several functions – namely allowing societies to exist and to be ordered – that are independent from their empirical validity. We do not mean that such beliefs are and have to be “wrong” to be efficient. But rather that their importance does not come from the fact that they would be “exact” or “true.” Certainly, when these beliefs have emerged, myths may have been related to specific events. But it does not necessarily matter, for their efficiency or for their effectiveness, whether or not myths are actually related to historical facts. Thus, foundational “myths” – these stories that explain the origins of societies – tend to become widely held and, at the same time, might be false. Keywords: Public Choice; Social Contract; Direct Democracy; Coercive Power; European Constitution (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-6784-8_1 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6784-8_1 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Studies in Public Choice from Springer |
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