Is the “Veil of Ignorance” in Constitutional Choice a Myth? An Empirical Exploration Informed by a Theory of Power

Louis M. Imbeau () and Steve Jacob ()
Additional contact information
Louis M. Imbeau: Laval University
Steve Jacob: Laval University

Chapter Chapter 5 in Constitutional Mythologies, 2011, pp 53-69 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A Constitution is a social contract defining a set of rules by which the governed agree to be governed. As such a Constitution ascribes power resources to governors while restraining the way they are expected to use them. But a Constitution is also a discourse on the prevailing conceptions of power relations in the society where it originated. More specifically, it tells a story about the types of power that need to be ascribed or restrained and those that need not. Looking at a Constitution from both viewpoints opens a new window for uncovering the motivations that drove its drafters in the Constitution-making process in which they were involved. In particular, it helps reveal the impact of uncertainty on Constitutional choices.

Keywords: Decision Maker; Power Relation; Political Power; Pressure Group; Social Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-6784-8_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9781441967848

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6784-8_5

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().