Direct Democracy and the Constitution

Bruno Frey, Alois Stutzer and Susanne Neckerman ()
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Susanne Neckerman: Center for European Research in Economics and University of Mannheim

Chapter Chapter 8 in Constitutional Mythologies, 2011, pp 107-119 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter applies a comparative view to evaluate initiatives and referendums in the context of Constitutional change. Instruments of direct democratic decision making are compared to those of a purely representative democratic system in which members of parliament decide Constitutional issues like basic rights, the scope of democratic decision making and market exchange, the organization of government and the judiciary, and the federal structure of the country. Section 2 briefly describes aspects of direct democratic decision making that we deem critical from a Constitutional economics perspective. In particular, we hint to changes in the political process if citizens are directly involved through initiatives and referendums.

Keywords: Median Voter; Direct Democracy; Representative Democracy; Vote Participation; Swiss Canton (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-6784-8_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6784-8_8

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