Parallelisms and Paralogisms in the European Court of Justice

Giuseppe Eusepi, Alessandra Cepparulo and Maurizio Intartaglia ()
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Maurizio Intartaglia: University of Sheffield

Chapter Chapter 9 in Constitutional Mythologies, 2011, pp 121-134 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Of all ideas that scholars of institutional matters cherish most, none has spawned more interest than judges’ impartiality. The demonstration that the judges’ behavior cannot be fully insulated from political influence is a household item for several books and articles. Yet, conventional analysis gives almost exclusive attention to custodianship per se. Also, one of us has already provided theoretical analyses on the guardian’s guardian problem (Eusepi 2006). However, works on how a guardian behaves in a supranational setting without a Constitution are rather scant. In the enlarged EU, ­sorting out the link between the member states’ courts and the European Court of Justice (henceforth ECJ) is becoming challenging. A study of the judges’ behavior in that sorting is critical for understanding what is unfolding within the EU legal system.

Keywords: Member State; Trade Mark; Parallel Import; Constitutional Court; Constitutional Treaty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-6784-8_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6784-8_9

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