Introduction: Long-Run Consequences of Electoral Rules Change: Comparing Italy and Japan

Bernard Grofman () and Daniela Giannetti ()
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Bernard Grofman: University of California
Daniela Giannetti: University of Bologna

Chapter Chapter 1 in A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform, 2011, pp 1-12 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the modern era, representation is the hallmark of democracy, and electoral rules structure how representation works and how effectively governments perform. Moreover, of the key structural variables in constitutional design,1 it is the choice of electoral system that is usually the most open to change.

Keywords: Electoral System; Party System; Liberal Democratic Party; Electoral Rule; Electoral Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-7228-6_1

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