Framed-field Experiment on Approval Voting and Evaluation Voting. Some Teachings to Reform the French Presidential Electoral System

Antoinette Baujard and Herrade Igersheim

Chapter Chapter 4 in In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform, 2011, pp 69-89 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents the framed-field experiment on Approval Voting and (+2,+1,0) Evaluation Voting rules that took place during the 2007 French presidential elections. It aims at comparing the two tested voting rules with the two-round plurality vote currently used in the French presidential electoral system, notably on the basis of questionnaires collected during the experiment. In particular, we seriously challenge two common beliefs about the advantages of the official voting system – the important number of candidates and the guaranteed absolute majority. Besides, we show that the criteria that proved to be appreciated by actual voters – expression, simplicity and transparency – are more likely to be respected by the tested voting rules, especially approval voting.

Keywords: Presidential Election; Vote Rule; Condorcet Winner; Absolute Majority; Strategic Vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-7539-3_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-7539-3_4

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