Buchanan on Freedom

Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Brooks
Additional contact information
Michael Brooks: University of Tasmania

Chapter Chapter 4 in Public Choice, Past and Present, 2013, pp 43-64 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Our object is to explicate Buchanan’s conception of individual liberty and to trace its connection to the “working themes” in his corpus-anarchy, contract, constitution, Pareto optimality, “public choice,” and so on. In doing so, we investigate a number of tensions in Buchanan’s conception—between a libertarian affinity with anarchy and constitutional contractarianism and that between procedural liberalism and classical liberalism.

Keywords: Constitutional Level; Individual Liberty; Simple Majority Rule; Classical Liberalism; Preference Satisfaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Buchanan on Freedom (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4614-5909-5_4

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9781461459095

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-5909-5_4

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().