Knowledge Asymmetry, Social Trust: Implications for Oversight

Merve Erdilmen ()
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Merve Erdilmen: McGill University

Chapter Chapter 10 in Anti-Corruption Evidence, 2020, pp 185-192 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter presents some cross-country analysis regarding a central issue: the lack of knowledge between parliamentary and non-parliamentary actors. A nuanced understanding of the way corruption operates sheds light on the need for a comprehensive and coexisting relationship between the agency-based and institutionalist frameworks as well as the knowledge and trust-based sociological accounts for the corruption. The disparity between different actors’ opinion on the effectiveness of oversight bodies reminds us the significance of the accurate and trustable information regarding the oversight bodies when one wants to shed light for the relationship between parliamentary oversight and corruption. The lack of knowledge on the way parliament and oversight bodies work blocks the effectiveness of civil society organizations and journalists in curbing corruption.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_10

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