Commercial Lobbying Firms: Lobbying as Business

Christopher J. Ellis () and Thomas Groll
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Christopher J. Ellis: University of Oregon

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 221-245 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter reviews the literature on commercial lobbying. It places this literature into the context of the broader lobbying literature. Commercial lobbyists work for for-profit organizations that sell their services as intermediaries between policymakers and special interest groups. This intermediation involves the transfer of resources from special interest groups to policymakers. These resources may be information, financial contributions, or direct involvement in legislating or campaigning. Commercial lobbyists’ actions may either complement or substitute for the activities of in-house lobbyists. The incentives faced by commercial lobbyists may be designed either by special interest groups, policymakers, or a combination of the two and depend on the institutional structure within which the actors interact. They may involve problems related to collective action, transaction costs, agency, and repeated games.

Keywords: Commercial lobbying; Lobbying firms; Lobbyists; Reputation; Repeated agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_11

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