Lobbying and Trade Protection

Xenia Matschke

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 267-286 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter presents trade policy and interest group influence using the USA and the European Union (EU) as examples. Traditionally, mainly economic interest groups engage in trade policy lobbying. For them, insider lobbying directed at the executive branch is quite easy, since the executive bodies responsible for trade policy need detailed technical information. Since the turn of the millennium, however, non-economic interest groups have also been increasingly active as trade policy lobbyists. They mainly address the legislature by using outsider lobbying strategies.

Keywords: Political economy of trade protection; Protection for sale; Insider and outsider lobbying; U.S. trade policy; European Union trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_13

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_13

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