Lobbying in the United States

Thomas Stratmann and Amberly Dozier ()
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Amberly Dozier: George Mason University

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 289-313 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter reviews the U.S. political institutions relevant for understanding and analyzing lobbying and contribution activities. We provide an overview of legislation regulating lobbying activities and summarize the amount of lobbying expenditures over time. We also describe the legislation surrounding campaign contributions and expenditures and who contributes and how much to federal election campaigns. We report that the empirical evidence is mixed regarding how election outcomes and ballot initiatives respond to campaign expenditures and campaign finance legislation. We then briefly discuss some studies that analyze the effect of lobbying and interest groups providing campaign contributions to politicians that may affect political decisions.

Keywords: Campaign finance; Money in politics; Campaign finance reform; Legislative voting behavior; Lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_14

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_14

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