Lobbying: A Public Choice Perspective

Andreas Polk

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 13-39 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The theoretical literature about lobbying discusses two main channels of influence: political contributions and informational lobbying. Lobbying with contributions reduces aggregate welfare. Informational lobbying, by virtue of informing politicians, improves policy decisions and increases welfare. The survey also explores specific topics related to lobbying, like group formation, the choice of the lobbying strategy, or relationships between influence channels. It also discusses how different policy instruments affect the incentives to lobby and the effects of lobbying regulation through contribution caps.

Keywords: Lobbying; Influence channels; Contributions; Quid pro quo; Information transmission; Electoral competition; Group formation; Contribution caps; Instrument choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_2

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