Lobbying from the Perspective of Behavioral Political Economy

Jan Schnellenbach ()
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Jan Schnellenbach: BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 41-58 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract From the perspective of a behavioral economic theory of lobbying, representation of special interests starts earlier than in a rational choice theory of lobbying. It already plays a role when it comes to the formation of political preferences, and it starts, for example, when expectations are formed under uncertainty in the political debate. Advocacy can also take advantage of phenomena such as conflicting and ambiguous individual preferences. This chapter discusses the specifically behavioral economics view on politics and how phenomena such as expressive political behavior, framing, and the deliberate exploitation of heuristics and biases can provide levers for special interest advocacy. The theoretical considerations are illustrated by two case studies.

Keywords: Behavioral political economy; Expressive behavior; Heuristics; Framing; Decision anomalies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_3

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