Policy Failure and Lobbying

David Stadelmann and Marco Frank
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Marco Frank: University of Bayreuth

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 59-75 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Politics in parliamentary democracies can be conceptualized as a market for political services. This chapter proposes a theoretical approach to identifying market failures in the political market, with a particular focus on the role of lobby groups. Monopoly power, asymmetric information, and externalities are identified as types of market failures that hinder the efficient functioning of the political market, particularly in the presence of lobbying. These market failures can lead to policy failures, where politicians represent the interests of lobby groups instead of the preferences of citizens. The paper also suggests possible solutions to reduce market failures in the political market through increased competition.

Keywords: Policy failure; Market failure; Asymmetric information; Citizen preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_4

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