Lobbying and Macroeconomic Development

Theresa Hager ()
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Theresa Hager: Johannes Kepler University Linz

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 77-99 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter reviews the scholarly discussion of Mancur Olson’s theories on interest groups as presented in his major works, “The Logic of Collective Action” (1965) and “The Rise and Decline of Nations” (1982). The main arguments concerning the disadvantage of large groups in organizing collective action and the consequences for economic growth derived from them are presented and critically appraised. The focus is on Olson’s argument of what he calls “institutional sclerosis,” which postulates a link between interest group activity and long-term economic growth. In addition, the empirical evidence presented in case studies and regression analyses over the past few decades is reviewed, categorized, and summarized in order to better understand the quantification of Olson’s main concepts and to assess the applicability of the theory.

Keywords: Lobbyism; Mancur Olson; Special interest groups; Institutional sclerosis; Growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_5

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