Informational Lobbying

Susanne Lohmann ()
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Susanne Lohmann: University of California, Los Angeles

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 103-141 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The noun phrase “informational lobbying” points at another kind of lobbying, namely, the corrupt kind: “transactional lobbying.” Economists propose transparency as a solution to the corrupt kind. Political scientists disagree. Informational lobbying is lobbying proper—in two senses of the word proper: it is an integral and functional feature of modern democracy, and there is nothing improper about it. If there is a lobbying problem (and there is) the solution is not transparency. Instead, the solution to the lobbying problem is more lobbying. If you are unhappy with the way lobbying skews political outcomes, you are invited to counter-lobby or to take action in some other form that will resonate politically, such as protesting or voting.

Keywords: Transactional lobbying; Informational lobbying; Translational lobbying; Special interest politics; American pluralism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_6

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