Government Formation and Political Institutions: Some Robust Findings

Johan Hellström ()
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Johan Hellström: Umeå University

A chapter in New Developments in the Study of Coalition Governments, 2024, pp 89-109 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter examines the impact of institutional settings on government formation in European democracies. Despite extensive research, there are few definitive conclusions regarding how political institutions influence government formation. For example, some studies suggest that an investiture vote encourages majority coalitions and discourages minority governments, while others find no such relationship. This chapter employs Extreme Bounds Analysis to reevaluate these conflicting findings. The results show that certain claims about the relationship between institutions and cabinet formation are robust (e.g., positive parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and constructive vote of no confidence), while others are sensitive to alternative model specifications (e.g., bicameralism).

Keywords: Government formation; Coalitions; Political institutions; Europe; Extreme bounds analysis; Sensitivity analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-69347-2_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-69347-2_5

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