 Conflicting Objectives of Cartel Members: Analysis of Voting Behavior in the NCAAKathleen A. Carroll (),
Dennis Coates () and
Brad Humphreys
Chapter Chapter 4 in Empirical Applications of the Median Voter Model, 2025, pp 59-85 from Springer Abstract: Abstract This chapter models the behavior of universities and colleges as members of the NCAA with two different groups: power teams and non-power teams. The model develops behavioral predictions for voting decisions made by schools in the two groups with respect to regulations on entry barriers and academic quality. The predictions of the model are tested using voting data on regulations related to the maximum number of athletic scholarships as an entry barrier to Division I and to the eligibility requirements for athletes as an indicator of academic quality. The empirical results support the predictions of the theoretical model that power and non-power institutions will vote differently depending on observable determinants of voting behavior like school size and the intensity of fan commitment to teams. The work extends economists’ understanding of how voter heterogeneity affects observed voting behavior. Date: 2025 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-87179-5_4 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-87179-5_4 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Studies in Public Choice from Springer |
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