The Political Economy of Public Pension Reform

Dashle G. Kelley ()
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Dashle G. Kelley: Grand View University

Chapter Chapter 7 in Empirical Applications of the Median Voter Model, 2025, pp 115-136 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Public pension plans in the United States face unprecedented insolvency risk form unfunded liabilities. Reforming state-level public retirement systems requires legislative action in most states, exposing the process of pension reform to various political influences. This chapter examines financial as well as political factors of public pension plans, comparing possible political motivations for pension reform. The empirical results suggest that pension reform decisions are largely independent from political biases and are primarily a response to pension underfunding. In addition, the chapter examines a hypothesis that news media have an important role in the political process of pension reform by providing low cost information to pension stakeholders. Empirical evidence confirms that dissemination of popular information on public pensions is a significant positive predictor of legislative reforms.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-87179-5_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-87179-5_7

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