Veilonomics: On the Use and Utility of Veils in Constitutional Political Economy

Stefan Voigt

Chapter Chapter 2 in Behind a Veil of Ignorance?, 2015, pp 9-33 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Time and again, discussions on “just” or “fair” constitutional rules are structured around the veil of ignorance (Rawls) or uncertainty (Buchanan). But how useful has this tool really been for identifying a set of rules large groups could agree to unanimously? Are thicker veils really connected with rules leading to more redistribution? This paper surveys the political economics literature broadly conceived and looks at theoretical, experimental, and empirical approaches. It concludes that the central conjectures of veilonomics are unsatisfactory on theoretical grounds and refuted both experimentally and empirically.

Keywords: Veil of ignorance; Veil of uncertainty; Fair constitutions; Constitutional political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H11 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-319-14953-0_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-14953-0_2

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