Testing the “Veil of Ignorance” Hypothesis in Constitutional Choice: Evidence from the German Grundgesetz

Agnes Strauß ()
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Agnes Strauß: University of Hamburg

Chapter Chapter 8 in Behind a Veil of Ignorance?, 2015, pp 135-153 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The German constitution gives only mixed evidence to support the three propositions formulated by the Veil of Ignorance Project. The content analysis of the Grundgesetz reveals a high share of authority-based power relations in the constitutional text and a majority of over 97% positive power relations. The complexity of the drafting process as well as the high number of involved veto players leads to the problem that the contribution of uncertainty on the content of the constitution may not be traceable only reviewing the constitutional text.

Keywords: Power Relation; Median Voter; Constitutional Rule; Veto Player; Nazi Regime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-319-14953-0_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-14953-0_8

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