The Constitution of Totalitarianism

Peter Bernholz ()
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Peter Bernholz: University of Basel

Chapter Chapter 7 in Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values, 2017, pp 51-62 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Can totalitarianism have a constitution or is this not a contradiction of terms? For does totalitarianism not substitute the rule of terror for the rule of law? (Arendt 1951). In this chapter, we are going to show that totalitarianism constitutes a rational system (as already discussed by Brzezinski 1956) which binds population and leaders by stable long-lasting rules, which form an unwritten or written constitution. It is exactly this constitutional trait of totalitarianism which is one of the main differences distinguishing it from dictatorship or tyranny, since the latter are characterized by the uncontrolled discretionary power of the tyrant.

Keywords: Legal System; Penal Code; Individual Freedom; Constitutional Rule; Discretionary Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-319-56907-9_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-56907-9_7

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