Downsian Competition with Assembly Democracy

Maria del Pino Ramos-Sosa and M. Socorro Puy

A chapter in The Political Economy of Governance, 2015, pp 231-249 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter studies a scenario of political competition between two parties, a traditional downsian party and a party implementing assembly democracy. The latter party celebrates a pre-electoral assembly and a post-electoral assembly open to all who wish to take part in which citizens are invited to launch proposals and vote over them. The multiple proposals at the assembly generates a lottery over some policies which is evaluated by voters against the single policy proposed by the traditional party. We show that extremist assembly parties induce the traditional party to locate at the median policy position, whereas centrist assembly parties move the traditional party away from the median just in the opposite direction of the assembly’s median. Besides, we find that centrist assemblies, with respect to extremist assemblies, have more chances of winning the elections.

Keywords: Political Party; Median Voter; Political Competition; Policy Position; Direct Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-15551-7_12

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319155517

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_12

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().