Rent Seeking and the Size of Parliamentary Majorities

Jan Klingelhöfer ()
Additional contact information
Jan Klingelhöfer: RWTH Aachen University, Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Mikroökonomie

A chapter in The Political Economy of Governance, 2015, pp 251-260 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter presents a model in which the party that loses the general elections can still try to capture the majority in Parliament by convincing members of the majority faction to switch sides. These attempts are not successful in equilibrium. Nonetheless, the results of the general elections are partly determined by this additional stage of political conflict. Larger majorities are shown to lead to lower rent payments and some voters therefore face a trade-off between lowering rent payments by supporting the party that wins the elections or supporting their preferred party. Multiple equilibria in the general elections with either party winning are possible. Moreover, the size of the equilibrium majority is larger than when no bribes after the elections are possible.

Keywords: General Election; Prime Minister; Median Voter; Party Leader; Conservative Party (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-15551-7_13

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319155517

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_13

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().