A Comment on Choice Rules and Median Outcomes
Jon Eguia and
Francesco Giovannoni ()
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Francesco Giovannoni: University of Bristol
A chapter in The Political Economy of Governance, 2015, pp 261-265 from Springer
Abstract This chapter studies one particular property of voting rules in applications in which the choice set is one-dimensional: whether the median alternative is chosen. Our results suggest that with three or more alternatives, it is difficult to rule out non-median outcomes, even if all voters have linear Euclidean preferences.
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Median Voter; Choice Rule; Condorcet Winner; Approval Vote (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-15551-7_14
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