Bargaining with Outside Options

Ken Binmore and Jon Eguia
Additional contact information
Ken Binmore: University of Bristol

A chapter in State, Institutions and Democracy, 2017, pp 3-16 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We begin by reviewing the theory of two-person bargaining and three-person bargaining over a unit of wealth in the presence of outside options. We then explore the implications and developments in the literature for bargaining games with more than three players, and in particular, for legislative bargaining games in a democratic assembly with many members who decide by majority rule how to divide a unit of wealth, or an infinite sequence of units of wealth.

Keywords: Bargaining Game; Winning Coalition; Breakdown Point; Bargaining Model; Bargaining Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-44582-3_1

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319445823

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-44582-3_1

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().