Lobbying Mechanisms

Martin Gregor ()

A chapter in State, Institutions and Democracy, 2017, pp 17-52 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Political influence of special interests is a rich phenomenon, challenging for both theory and empirics. One of the key questions is whether the influence is through the provision of money, information, or both. In the first generation of empirical studies, the monetary channel is examined by looking upon the effect of campaign contributions through Political Action Committees on roll call voting. The results of the roll call voting studies conducted in the United States since 1970s are nevertheless inconclusive. Even descriptive evidence suggests that campaign contributions through Political Action Committees are not as important as direct individual contributions (Ansolabehere et al. 2003).

Keywords: Cheap Talk; Campaign Contribution; Mandatory Disclosure; Political Action Committee; Default Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-44582-3_2

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