The Anatomy of Institutional and Organizational Failure

Karl A. McDermott and Carl R. Peterson
Additional contact information
Karl A. McDermott: NERA
Carl R. Peterson: NERA

Chapter Chapter 4 in Obtaining the Best from Regulation and Competition, 2005, pp 65-92 from Springer

Abstract: CONCLUSIONS We have attempted to show that regulatory failures are products of institution designs where rigidities in the ability of the institutions to adapt to shocks lead to profound disappointment in the public’s expectations. The politically sensitive character of these essential services makes them ripe for instant reform. Kahn (1988, p.xxxvii) has pointed out we really don’t have a choice between perfect markets and perfect regulation as he admonished the “…central institutional issue of public utility regulation” remains the one that I identified at that time- finding the best possible mix of inevitably imperfect regulation and inevitably imperfect competition.” In selecting new institutions we need to learn from the lessons past and present that care in the design and implementation is critical. In restructuring efforts around the world today we still find rhetoric prevailing over analysis. There are still those who say all we need are property rights and everything else will fall into place. If there is one lesson to be learned from our regulatory history it is that there are no simple solutions, no silver bullets and no quick fixes.

Keywords: Public Utility; Retail Market; Spot Market; Wholesale Market; Natural Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:topchp:978-0-387-23196-9_4

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9780387231969

DOI: 10.1007/0-387-23196-X_4

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().