Enhancing Competition by Unbundling the Postal Administration

John Haldi and William J. Olson
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John Haldi: Haldi Associates, Inc.
William J. Olson: Olson Law Offices

Chapter Chapter 11 in Progress toward Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector, 2006, pp 173-189 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Attempts to bring the rigors of competition to postal authorities via deregulation have stumbled repeatedly over the following dilemma: (i) the Universal Service Obligation (“USO”) has powerful political support; (ii) the postal monopoly is asserted to be necessary to assure funding of the USO; and (iii) a fully de-regulated government monopoly is unacceptable. The unbundling model presented in this paper offers a solution to this dilemma. Although scope of the existing monopoly over delivery would not be reduced by this proposal, unbundling the upstream portion of the network would reduce substantially the amount of resources protected by the monopoly, while preserving the USO.

Keywords: Postal Network; Level Playing Field; Natural Monopoly; Postal Administration; Implicit Prex (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:topchp:978-0-387-29744-6_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-29744-6_11

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