Incentives of Compensating USO Net Costs

Felix Gottschalk, Urs Trinkner and Eva Zuberbühler
Additional contact information
Felix Gottschalk: Swiss Post Ltd
Eva Zuberbühler: Swiss Economics

A chapter in Postal Strategies, 2023, pp 127-140 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter rebuts the widespread intuition that compensating the net costs of universal service obligations narrows the provider’s incentives to reduce its costs or achieve growth. An illustrative example and a numerical simulation show that net cost compensation implies that potential gains of efficiency and growth measures are shared between the universal service provider and the public, and therefore, the former has incentives to implement such measures while the latter benefits from paying lower compensations.

Keywords: Universal service obligation; Postal service funding; Net cost compensation; Cost efficiency; Growth incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:topchp:978-3-031-25362-1_10

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783031253621

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-25362-1_10

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().