Allocating Fixed Costs of the Outdoor Delivery: A Cooperative Game Approach

Olga Bohorquez Suarez and Léa Munich ()
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Olga Bohorquez Suarez: Groupe La Poste
Léa Munich: Université de Lorraine, under CIFRE Contract at the Groupe La Poste

A chapter in Postal Strategies, 2023, pp 253-268 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Cooperative game theory can be used to allocate outdoor delivery fixed costs to different services, either by taking into account the delivery speed of the products or by taking into account their formats. Delivery speed fixed costs could be allocated by using an airport game. It is also possible to allocate delivery fixed costs according to the format of the various products by using a classical cooperative game. For both types of allocation problems, we used the Shapley value because it satisfies several axioms relevant to postal costs allocation. The Shapley value is fair and may be useful to justify compliance with competition law. The allocation rules derived from game theory have the advantage of being systematic, operational and scientifically recognized.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-25362-1_19

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