The Challenge of Designing Access to the Postal Network: An Economics Perspective

Henrik Ballebye Okholm, Bruno Basalisco, Julia Wahl and Mindaugas Cerpickis
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Henrik Ballebye Okholm: Copenhagen Economics
Bruno Basalisco: Copenhagen Economics
Julia Wahl: Copenhagen Economics
Mindaugas Cerpickis: Copenhagen Economics

A chapter in The Changing Postal and Delivery Sector, 2017, pp 301-319 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Access to the postal network has figured prominently in the regulatory debate as more and more operators are required to provide access to their postal network. Yet, guidance for operators and regulators on how to design access regimes that withstand a regulatory and competition review has to date been surprisingly limited. A faulty design of the pricing and non-pricing part of access can have negative implications for the postal operator’s (PO’s) profitability, for competition, for economic efficiency and ultimately the social welfare resulting from market outcomes.

Keywords: Allocative Efficiency; Postal Network; Quantity Rebate; Access Price; Dominant Company (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:topchp:978-3-319-46046-8_20

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-46046-8_20

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