Political Competition, Policy Making, and the Quality of Public Policies in Costa Rica
Fabrice Lehoucq
No 28007 in World Bank Publications - Books from The World Bank Group
Abstract:
This paper uses a case study of Costa Rica to identify the reasons why democracy is conducive for development. By the mid-twentieth century, Costa Rica had begun to depart from the all-too-common mixture of political instability and economic stagnation characteristic of much of the developing world. This paper claims that this country has benefited from better-than-average public policies, a conclusion based upon an original assessment of policy effectiveness and a major comparative ranking of state policies. It largely rejects the interpretation that uncommon development performance stems from institutions created during the colonial period and instead emphasizes how unending political stalemates gradually made the struggle for power more democratic. A central conclusion of this paper is that political competition-as well as steady economic growth rates and development, more generally-interact with and reinforce each other so that the exercise of power foments rather than retards economic growth.
Keywords: Governance-Democratic Government Governance-Political Systems and Analysis Governance-Politics and Government Macroeconomics and Economic Growth-Economic Policy; Institutions and Governance Macroeconomics and Economic Growth-Economic Theory & Research Macroeconomics and Economic Growth-Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:28007
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