Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design
Jacob Glazer () and
Ariel Rubinstein ()
in World Scientific Books from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Abstract:
This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory.
Keywords: Bounded Rationality; Behavioral Economics; Implementation; Mechanism Design; Persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
ISBN: 9789813141322
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https://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/10069 (text/html)
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Chapters in this book:
- Ch 1 An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game* , pp 1-11

- Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
- Ch 2 Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions* , pp 13-29

- Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
- Ch 3 Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules , pp 31-47

- Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
- Ch 4 On Optimal Rules of Persuasion* , pp 49-74

- Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
- Ch 5 A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach , pp 75-94

- Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
- Ch 6 A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents , pp 95-122

- Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
- Ch 7 Complex Questionnaires , pp 123-138

- Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wsbook:10069
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