Incentives, Regulatory Capture and Collapse

Haim Kedar-Levy

Chapter 12 in A Critical History of Financial Crises:Why Would Politicians and Regulators Spoil Financial Giants?, 2016, pp 139-157 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: The following sections are included:IntroductionThe Role of the FedRegulatory capture and the Gramm–Leach–Bliley ActPrivate-Label MBSIncentivesThe Role of Hybrid LoansThe Crash UnfoldsShould the Government Have Stepped In?Conclusions of the Inquiry CommissionWere the Regulators Captured by the Industry?Additional Reading

Keywords: Financial Crises; Bubbles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9781908977472_0012 (application/pdf)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9781908977472_0012 (text/html)
Ebook Access is available upon purchase.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wschap:9781908977472_0012

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in World Scientific Book Chapters from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().