Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods

George Zodrow () and Peter Mieszkowski

Chapter 17 in Taxation in Theory and Practice:Selected Essays of George R Zodrow, 2019, pp 525-542 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: Pigou’s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper. A simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services. The case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered.

Keywords: Taxes; Taxation; Tax Reform; Consumption Taxation; State and Local Finance; Tax Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Journal Article: Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods (1986)
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