Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games

Robert J. Aumann

Chapter 1 in Selected Contributions to Game Theory, 2025, pp 1-42 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: The following sections are included:IntroductionNotationGeneral Cooperative GamesAcceptable PointsTwo-Person, Zero-Sum GamesStrategies and Payoffs in the SupergameStrong Equilibrium PointsApplication of Approachability and Excludability TheoryThe Main Theorem: First HalfThe Main Theorem: Second HalfExistence of Acceptable PointsThe Expected PayoffEnforceability of AgreementsReferences

Keywords: Economics; Economic Theory; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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