Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies

Robert Aumann

Chapter 4 in Selected Contributions to Game Theory, 2025, pp 73-113 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: The following sections are included:IntroductionExamplesThe Formal ModelPreliminaries and GeneralitiesEquilibrium Points in Two-Person GamesTwo-Person Zero-Sum GamesProof of the Propositions of Section 4.4A Posteriori EquilibriaDiscussionAcknowledgmentReferences

Keywords: Economics; Economic Theory; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Related works:
Working Paper: Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies (2010)
Journal Article: Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)
Working Paper: Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies (1974)
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