Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament

Robert J. Aumann

Chapter 10 in Selected Contributions to Game Theory, 2025, pp 243-305 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: The following sections are included:IntroductionA Case When a Player Cannot Benefit in the Long Run from His InformationA Case When a Player Should Disclose His InformationA Case When a Player Should Partially Disclose His InformationThe Main TheoremThe Optimal Strategy of Player 2ConclusionsWhere Do We Go From Here?Postscripts to Chapter TenMartingalesConvexity and Concavity as Monotonicity in InformationThe Error TermOptimal Strategies of the Uninformed PlayerMonotonicity of vn and the Recursive Structure of ΓnReferences

Keywords: Economics; Economic Theory; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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