Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?

Thomas Prusa

Chapter 2 in Economic Effects of Antidumping, 2021, pp 1-20 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: The number of antidumping petitions initiated has increased dramatically in recent years. However, only one-third of antidumping cases actually result in dumping duties being levied. Surprisingly, nearly as many antidumping cases are withdrawn or are voluntarily terminated. We present data that show that these withdrawn cases have at least as great an effect on trade as cases which resulted in duties. We discuss legal reasons why such settlements are possible and present a model of the bargaining process. We find that petitions with low probability of success (‘nuisance’ suits) actually confer large gains to both domestic and foreign firms.

Keywords: Antidumping; Trade Effects; USA; US; Trade Protection; Trade Barriers; Temporary Trade Barriers; Pricing Behaviour; Antidumping Law; Law; Cost-Based Trade Policy; Macroeconomy; Cumulation; ITC Decision-making; WTO; Safeguard Protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Journal Article: Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn? (1992)
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