Exponential Smoothed Tit-for-Tat

Michael Filzmoser
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Michael Filzmoser: School of Business Administration, Economics, and Statistics, University of Vienna, Vienna, A-1210, Austria

Chapter 6 in The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma:20 Years On, 2007, pp 127-138 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThe following sections are included:IntroductionExponential Smoothed Tit-for-TatExponential SmoothingStrategies for Competitions with and without NoiseTournament ResultsConclusionsReferences

Keywords: Iterated Prisoners Dilemma; Game Theory; Cooperation; Defection; Competition; Axelrod (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C1 C5 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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